All Charges to be Substantiated

Captain Rachpal Singh vs. Union of India

Filed under:  Rules 15(a) (ii), (iii) and 15-A, Army Rules, 1954
Appellant: Capt.Rachpal Singh
Respondent: Unionof India
Citation:(1987)1 Supreme Court Cases 172
Court: In the Supreme Court of India
Judges: RS Pathak and V Khalid

Facts

Rachpal Singh joined the Indian Army as an Emergency commissioned Officer. During his service he was promoted to the rank of Acting Captain. After about 6 years of service, he was released from the Army. According to Rachpal he had sustained three injuries during service. The first injury was sustained while he was on patrolling duty and the second injury during military service. He also suffered from a third injury, which had been incurred along with the first but was not detected at that time but was discovered subsequently.

Thereafter he was placed in temporary medical category ‘CEE’ for the first two injuries. This category was later upgraded and he was placed in temporary medical category, ‘BEE-1’. After re-examination he was given medical category ‘BEE-2’ permanent. Rachpal’s main disagreement with the order was that his release from service needed to be in compliance with the procedure laid down in Army Rule 15-A.

Since this was not done he made several representations to the higher authorities, but without any success. He then filed a suit in the Civil Court, Gurdaspur for a declaration that the release was not valid under the law. The Civil Court dismissed the suit. He then approached the High Court of Delhi for issuance of an appropriate direction to the effect that the release order was unjust.

This Writ Petition was also dismissed. He then moved the Supreme Court. While his appeal was pending in the Supreme Court, Rachpal received a communication from the Union of India to the effect that the disability caused to him should be regarded as attributable to military service. On receipt of this letter he requested the Court to allow him to withdraw his appeal so that he could make the suitable representation to the concerned authorities.

The Court permitted this request and Rachpal made a representation. However, this representation was rejected and he was told that he had been discharged on the basis of a phased programme. Rachpal then filed a Writ Petition at the Delhi High Court, challenging this order but this petition was dismissed. Rachpal then filed this appeal.

Arguments made on behalf of Rachpal

Rachpal’s main contention was that the reason given behind his discharge was not true. According to him, the Indian army had stated that he was discharged on the basis of a phased programme. However, Rachpal said that this order had been so worded so as to escape the procedure laid down in Rule 15-A. Rachpal strongly relied on a previous case in order to support his contentions.

Arguments made on behalf of the Indian Army

The Indian Army on the other hand filed a counter-affidavit, which stated that Rachpal’s release was not under Rule 15-A, but under a phased programme. It was stated that Rachpal was granted Emergency Commission for the duration of National Emergency and for so long as his services were required and the Emergency Commission was liable to be terminated at any time by the Government of India. It was further stated that Rachpal’s contention that he was at all times governed by Rule 15-A of the Army Rules, 1954 was incorrect since this provision was not applicable to him.

Rachpal was released from Emergency Commission, as he was ineligible to apply for grant of Permanent Commission. It was further stated that he was released from the Army as per the relevant rules of the Army instructions, under the phased programme for release of Emergency Commissioned Officers. It was also pointed out that even though Rachpal had applied for grant of Permanent Regular Commission, his application had been rejected as he did not fulfill the condition of acceptable medical category and was therefore ineligible to apply for grant of Permanent Commission.

It was also argued that he was released from the Indian Army on medical grounds as his medical category had fallen due to the injuries sustained by him during active military service. He had not been told that he was released on medical grounds. It was pointed out that Rachpal had taken shelter in the Ministry of Defense letter, which inadvertently had mentioned, ‘invalidated out of service.’ This mistake had later been rectified.

Observations of the Court

The Court examined the relevant sections of the Army Act, the Rules and Regulations and Instructions that govern the service conditions of the commissioned officers including those on Emergency Commission. In light of these, the Court held that Rachpal Singh’s release order was according to a phased programme. The Court also pointed out that a mistake had been made in the letter issued by the Ministry of Defense and this had been rectified. Therefore, his claim that he was invalidated out of service on medical grounds was not justified.

Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal.

Cases Referred:

  • Virendra Kumar vs. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 485

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Lt. Col. Jagannath Singh Pathania (Retd.) vs. Union of India (UOI) and Anr

Filed Under: Service Law
Appellant: Lt. Col. Jagannath Singh Pathania (Retd)
Respondent: Union of India (UOI) and Anr
Citation: Writ Petition No. 388 (S/B) of 2004, decided on (10.02.2005)
Court: In the High Court of Uttaranchal
Judge: V.S. Sirpurkar

Facts

Lt. Col. Jagannath Singh Pathania is a retired military officer who applied for the post of an administrative officer at the National Institute of Visually Handicapped and was selected by a competent Selection Committee. In the communication of his selection, it was specified that it was a contractual appointment for a period of one year, extendable on an annual basis. He joined the post, and it was later conveyed to him that the Competent Authority had approved of his continuation for a further period of one year.

However, ultimately, no extension was granted to him, and he was directed to hand over the charge to another person. Jagannath treated this order to handover charge to be a termination order. Aggrieved, he filed the current Writ Petition challenging it on the ground that the termination order had been given by an authority that was lower to the Appointing Authority.

Arguments made on behalf of Jagannath

It was pointed on behalf of Jagannath by his lawyer that the Appointing Authority for Group ‘A’ posts was the Chairman, Executive Council and for posts under Group ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘D’, it was the Director. The argument further went that since the order to handover charge was by the Director i.e. by an authority that was lower to the Chairman, Executive Council, it was illegal. For these reasons, it was argued if the order was illegal, the consequential reliefs must follow: of continuation in the service and of payment of back wages.

Arguments made on behalf of Government of India

On behalf of Government of India, it was argued that the communication was not a termination order at all and was a mere direction to handover the charge. It was further argued that his was purely a contractual appointment for one year and was extendable on annual basis. It was pointed out that when the contract had not been extended, the question of a termination order or of continuation in the service did not arise at all.

Observation of the Court

The court was of the view that the petition was wholly misconceived. It pointed out that Jagannath’s services had been extended by a communication, which had also been signed by the Director in charge, conveying the approval of the Competent Authority. The court further stated that the order for the handover of charge was also nothing but a communication by the Director in charge.

It was not a termination order. Finally, it was concluded that since the extension was not granted by a Competent Authority, the handing over of the charge was the most natural step. Besides, the Court held that it was not necessary for the authorities to pass any termination order because two days later the services of Jagannath would have automatically ended.

Held: The petition was therefore dismissed.

Cases Referred:

  • Dr.(Mrs.) S.K.Bhatia vs. State of Punjab, 1997 (6) SLR (P & H) 39.

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